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*Conv. 48  On April 6, 2012, Pt 6 Ch.5 of the Localism Act 2011 (“the Localism Act”) came into force.
Section 124 gave Local Planning Authorities (“LPAs”) the power to apply to the magistrates’ court to take
planning enforcement action outside of the normal four- and ten-year time limits in situations where there
may have been a breach of planning control involving concealment.
1
 Providing an LPA applies within six
months from the date of knowledge of evidence of the apparent breach,
2
 and the court is satisfied, on the
balance of probabilities, that the apparent breach has been deliberately concealed and that it is just to do
so,
3
 a planning enforcement order (“PEO”) will be made.
This effectively eliminates immunity from enforcement action and the ability to obtain a certificate for lawful
status under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
4
 (“the 1990 Act ”) for a number of individuals who
have breached planning controls and have concealed the breach.
Why introduce s.124?
Section 124 is a direct response to two high-profile cases, Fidler v Secretary of State for Communities and
Local Government (“ Fidler ”) and Welwyn Hatfield Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government (“ Beesley ”). Both cases involved the deliberate concealment of unauthorised building.
In Fidler, Mr Fidler unsuccessfully claimed the LPA was time barred from taking enforcement action after
constructing a mock tudor castle without planning permission and concealing it for more than four years
behind a 40-foot high straw bale wall covered in blue plastic sheeting. The court held the LPA’s enforcement
notice had been validly served and was within the four-year window for taking enforcement action. In
reaching its conclusion the court ruled that the erection and removal of this wall and sheeting were relevant
to the issue of when operations*Conv. 49  were substantively completed, forming part of Fidler’s original
contemplation and intention. It ruled that operations under s.55 of the 1990 Act were not substantially
completed until these items were removed.
By contrast, Mr Beesley obtained planning permission to erect a hay barn. Whilst erecting an agricultural
barn in external appearance, internally the building comprised a residential property. Beesley applied for a
certificate of lawful use under s.191(1)(a) of the 1990 Act, claiming immunity from enforcement action
under the four-year rule. Beesley unsuccessfully argued his actions amounted to a breach of planning
control due to a change of use of the property from a hay barn to a single dwelling house. The Supreme
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Court ruled no change of use had occurred and as such no benefit of immunity from enforcement action
could be sought. Beesley was dealt a second blow when the Supreme Court held the council could not only
seek enforcement action against the continued use of the building as a single dwelling but also against its
construction itself, which it ruled unlawful.
5
Whilst both Fidler and Beesley ultimately failed in their attempts to manipulate the planning system, what
became abundantly clear were gaping holes within s.171B, which had now been exposed for others to
exploit.
The 1990 Act had been drafted in such a way that individuals only need to demonstrate the requisite time
period has passed from the date of the breach of planning control. Dishonesty and an intention to deceive is
irrelevant in obtaining immunity. Both the inspector and Sir Thayne Forbes in Fidler observed that “hiding
something does not take away lawful rights that may accrue due to the passage of time.”
6
 Mummery L.J. in
Beesley also commented that he had not
“been referred to anything in the planning legislation that expressly precluded Mr Beesley from relying on
the time limits by reason of his false representations, so assume that there is no such provision.” 
7
Nothing stops or affects the clock once started.
The Government’s response
These cases troubled the Coalition Government by exposing such weaknesses within the planning system.
There was also great concern that the cases had undermined the importance of obtaining planning
permission and eroding public confidence in the enforcement process.
8
On December 13, 2010, before Mr Beesley’s appeal to the Supreme Court had been heard, the Localism Bill
(“the Bill”) was introduced in the House of Commons. Whilst the main thrust of the Bill related to a package
of democratic reforms, tucked away within Ch.5 were four clauses relating to enforcement of planning
control. Designed to amend the 1990 Act, it proposed to give LPAs power to apply to the magistrates’ court
to take enforcement action outside of the normal time limits, specifically where it appeared a breach of
planning control involving concealment had occurred.
9
 Its aim was to stop profiteering by*Conv. 50 
“people who deliberately deceive the LPA about the nature of their intended development or who conceal it
until the window for enforcement action has expired.” 
10
Richard Humphreys argued that these reforms went a long way to restoring confidence in the enforcement
regime.
11
 The changes have been heavily criticised from the outset by the legal profession as “entirely
disproportionate”,
12
 however. In its parliamentary brief on the Bill the Law Society recommended the
deletion of cl.104 (as it then was). Their Planning and Environmental Law Committee pointed out they were
unaware of any similar cases in the planning system’s 60-year history and therefore it would be highly
inappropriate to make such a fundamental change to the planning rules. The Royal Town Planning Institute
described the changes as a “sledge hammer to crack a relatively small nut.”
13
Criticism surrounding s.124 falls into three areas. First, the section’s definitions are not clear thereby
causing difficulty in ascertaining who is liable and how they become liable. Secondly, it eliminates a clear
limitation period and as such removes certainty for those involved in the planning and conveyancing
process. Finally, the use of the magistrates’ court is seen as highly problematic.
A clear definition
The Coalition Government’s objective in its impact assessment accompanying the Bill was
“to ensure that people who deliberately deceive or who conceal [the breach] until the window for
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enforcement action has expired, [were] no longer able to profit from this practice.” 
14
Whilst designed to deal with the likes of Fidler and Beesley, there are concerns that s.124 goes beyond its
original scope. The rationale for this is on the basis that “concealment” has not been clearly defined.
Consequently s.124 casts its net too wide and catches a far larger group of people than intended.
Establishing concealment may not be straightforward, however.
In its original form, the Localism Act proposed that liability would be based on a person’s actions that had
resulted in or contributed to full or partial concealment of the apparent breach. The Law Society had major
difficulties with this, particularly as proposed liability was based on concealment, rather than fraud or
dishonesty.
15
 As such, liability would not be limited to the likes of Beesley and Fidler who had actively
deceived.
The term “actions” was originally defined to include representations and inactions. Although it was
understandable that “representations” be included to ensure those who are proactive and directly deceive
are culpable, the inclusion of the word “inaction” was not. The Law Society believed the inclusion of the
term*Conv. 51  “inaction” would result in property owners becoming liable for all concealed breaches
including any deliberate actions of past owners. Such an interpretation could also result in liability for any
individuals aware of or who suspected a past breach of planning but who had failed to act and report the
breach to the LPA; effectively, liability through silence. Other examples put forward included situations
where breaches had been concealed to subsequent property owners by their vendor
16
 and commercial
transactions involving the purchase of a company owning properties rather than the properties
themselves.
17
 This approach was criticised for “being too wide and encompass[ing] conduct far removed
from the antics of Mr Beesley and Mr Fidler.”
18
Humphreys, in the minority, welcomed the inclusion of “inaction”, believing that those concealing breach by
failing to notify the council tax department would be liable.
19
 The Coalition Government defended its
position, stating that the amendments gave scope for LPAs to take action where none previously existed.
20
The House of Lords, however, took onboard the concerns, tightening the definition and clarifying that
concealment must be deliberate. “Inaction”, too, was removed from the examples of concealment in a bid
to show that s.124 was “aimed only at the worst cases of concealment.”
21
In its final form, s.124 allows an order to be made where the apparent breach has been deliberately
concealed.
22
 Whilst these amendments have been welcomed, there are still concerns. Some argue that
s.124 will still not deal with those it was intended to.
What constitutes deliberate concealment?
The literal definition is a conscious or intentional
23
 action of hiding something or preventing it from being
known.
24
 Note that it is the concealment of the breach rather than the breach itself that is relevant.
Commonsense suggests that when considering the term “deliberate concealment” it “ought to require more
than mere oversight”
25
 to inform the LPA that a breach had occurred. A concerted effort to prevent the LPA
from finding out about the breach is therefore required to trigger liability. If this approach is correct then
s.124 may not effectively deal with those the Coalition Government intended it to deal with.
Four weeks before s.124 came into force the case of Mr and Mrs Brown, who had constructed and occupied
a wooden-clad building in wooded land in Surrey
26
 without planning permission, was reported. As with
Fidler and Beesley, the property*Conv. 52  was built in a designated greenbelt area where planning
permission would have almost certainly been refused if legitimately applied for. Like Fidler and Beesley, the
Browns were aware of the four-year rule relating to immunity from enforcement action. They, too, failed to
notify the Local Authority for the purposes of council tax, electoral roll and building regulation consent, and,
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like Fidler, planning permission was never sought. The distinguishing factor here was that the property had
not been deliberately camouflaged nor had there been any clandestine or night-time construction of the
property, as in Fidler. The property had been built in a dip within wooded land, shielded by trees.
Although not in force at this point, s.124 was considered. Section 124 states that it is the concealment of
the breach that triggers liability. Was it therefore possible for the LPA to argue a deliberate administrative
concealment of the breach by failing to notify the various council departments? Or did there have to be a
physical concealment of the breach?
Following legal advice, Mold Valley District Council’s LPA took the view that the Brown’s actions did not
amount to deliberate concealment. As such, a PEO would not be successfully obtained outside the four-year
period. In a move that may have turned Beesley and Fidler green with envy, the LPA issued the Browns
with a Certificate of Lawful Use under s.191 of the 1990 Act.
Enforcement proceedings under the 1990 Act and applications for PEOs under s.124 are, after all,
discretionary. It is possible that the LPA, being fully aware of the time and expense involved in Fidler and
Beesley, did not have the stomach to test its position, particularly given the current finances of Local
Authorities.
This case provides an interesting insight into how “deliberate concealment” may be interpreted. Whilst an
intriguing starting point, it is clear that more cases are required before we will be in a position to ascertain
exactly what deliberate concealment entails, and what triggers liability. It is ironic that in its first test s.124
has failed to do what it was intended to do, given the Coalition Government’s objective.
Whilst it may be the case that s.124 has proven itself ineffective before it has even begun, there is also the
question of how it will impact upon subsequent owners. This concern still remains even with the removal of
the term “inaction” as to how such owners are protected against liability under s.124.
The Coalition Government and supporters of s.124 argue that PEOs will only be applied for in rare cases,
27
with magistrates only granting them where there has been deliberate concealment and where it is just to
make the order, having regard to all the circumstances. Logic suggests it would not be just to make a PEO
against a subsequent purchaser if they can demonstrate they were a bona fide purchaser. One would hope
if no breach or no deliberate concealment of a breach is revealed following searches and investigations this
would be sufficient to discharge any liability.
A prudent purchaser should still remain cautious, protecting their position by ensuring that all necessary
paperwork is produced beyond the four- and ten-year limitation periods. This is particularly important given
that purchasers and their legal advisers are on notice of the potential liability under s.124.*Conv. 53 
There had been anxiety as to how historic breaches would be treated under s.124. With immunity
effectively removed, it was feared that LPAs would be able to make PEO applications regarding any breach
of planning, including historic breaches. Many owners, having purchased their property aware of a historic
breach but relying upon the immunity previously granted under the 1990 Act, were nervous. They could not
rely on the bona fide purchaser argument, as they did have notice of the breach. It was hoped that if
immunity had previously been obtained then it would now be difficult if not impossible to undo the effects of
a reliance on the 1990 Act years after the event.
28
 To do so would be unjust and would have the potential
to throw the conveyancing system into complete disarray. Thankfully, the Coalition Government saw sense
and confirmed that s.124 would not apply to breaches prior to April 6, 2012 where the requisite four- or
ten-year period had also been completed before this date.
29
 This was clearly a relief to property owners
and their solicitors alike.
The need for limitation
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Whilst s.124 has not been allowed to wreak the havoc many had feared, at the heart of the criticism is still
the removal of a limitation period for enforcement action for breaches after April 6, 2012. Lord Taylor of
Holbeach reassured the House of Lords that s.124 is aimed only at the worst cases of concealment, and the
Coalition Government had no appetite to abolish the limitation for enforcement action.
30
 Many are still
fearful of this, however.
The Localism Act takes away a definitive cut-off point whereby property owners cease to be liable from
enforcement action by the LPAs. Such clarity is important not only for the planning system but also for the
conveyancing process, as uncertainty brings detrimental effects to future purchasers and the property
market.
When Robert Carnwath QC reviewed the planning system
31
 prior to the 1990 Act, he recognised that the
enforcement time limits under the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 (“the 1968 Act”) were failing. Why?
The 1968 Act altered the position on immunity, changing it from a rolling four-year time limit to that of a
fixed date. Under s.15,
32
 whilst the four-year rolling time limit remained in force in three situations
33
 :
operations
34
 ; failure to comply with any condition or limitations relating to such operations
35
 ; and change
of use of any building to use as a single dwelling-house,
36
 the LPA were now able to take enforcement
action for a breach of any material change of use occurring after the end of 1963. Any breaches prior to
that date were immune from enforcement action. As such, individuals faced a constant threat of
enforcement action on any breaches of planning post 1963. This*Conv. 54  lack of certainty proved
problematic, especially in relation to the conveyancing process.
Section 124 has again removed a definite legal test
37
 that Carnwath believed crucial. It is interesting that
criticisms now being put forward against s.124 are the same arguments expressed 25 years ago in the
Carnwath Report.
In a bold move, the Law Society called for the removal of s.124 and is still opposed to it now. Its main
objection is based on the fundamental principle that limitation periods are necessary. This is based on three
main arguments:
1. asserting rights needs evidence: and evidence and memories fade over time;
2. certainty is vital; and
3. a person who does not promptly enforce their rights should lose them.
38
Memories fade
Fixed time limits have always been problematic: Carnwath acknowledged this. Critics of the 1968 Act
argued that whilst it was easy to provide evidence and prove non-compliance with planning rules
immediately following the 1968 Act, as time passed the task became harder. The 1968 Act ’s fixed date
watershed was seen as “far too long ago to be a sensible or useful date for immunity of uses.”
39
 As
memories become hazy and information and records lost, it became harder to establish that a pre-1963
breach had occurred. The Localism Act has again returned to a similar situation by removing limitation for
any deliberately concealed breach where the immunity has not been reached by April 6, 2012.
Today this task is hampered further, as we move towards a system of e-conveyancing. A move to paperless
transactions means the physical evidence is simply absent. Mortgage lenders, too, are less willing to retain
paperwork at the end of conveyancing transactions. The result is that property owners may not have
knowledge of breaches of planning nor be aware of the significance of information given to them. The result
is that vital evidence is lost forever.
Property professionals now find themselves in a catch-22 situation, required to provide absolute certainty
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regarding a property’s legal and planning status for buyers and their mortgage providers but without the
means to obtain the necessary evidence. This is further complicated by the current economic climate and
mortgage lenders’ increased caution and risk aversion.
Many in the legal profession consulted prior to the 1990 Act favoured the return of a rolling limitation period
to provide a “definite legal test”.
40
 The rolling time limit not only offered certainty but was also practical.
That is not to say the 1990 Act is without issue, but the implementation of s.124 is a backward
step.*Conv. 55 
The need for certainty
Well-defined time limits are vital to provide a clear understanding of when potential liability ceases. Many
areas within the law have limitation periods, and with that comes certainty for all involved. Ashley Bowes
observed that “if the passive standardisation dynamic is one pillar of the planning system, legal certainty
must surely be the other.”
41
 The need for certainty has been the main argument put forward by the Law
Society against s.124.
The planning system and, in turn, the conveyancing process need clear rules to advise prospective
purchasers of their potential liability, enabling them to make an informed decision as to whether to
proceed. The changes under s.124 make it impossible for solicitors to advise with confidence on planning
liability and enforcement issues.
Prior to the Localism Act, solicitors could work within the parameters of the four- and ten-year time limits,
ensuring requisitions and investigations were tailored to potential breaches within these time periods. Such
a system makes the conveyancing process clear and not unduly burdensome. The conveyancing process
generally does not require an investigation of the property’s entire legal history in order to advise the
clients or satisfy the lender’s requirement of a good and marketable title. In unregistered land, for example,
a period of at least 15 years must be investigated in order to prove good root of title.
42
 Solicitors have
come to rely upon these cut-off periods to provide certainty whilst ensuring efficiency and speed of service,
essential when buyers’, sellers’ and increasingly lenders’ expectations are of low costs and quick
completions.
Some highlight Listed Building Control as a system offering no immunity from breaches but able to function
with relative ease and clarity within the conveyancing process. Listed Building Control is by comparison a
different beast. First, far fewer buildings are affected by Listed Building Control compared to general
planning controls, with approximately 374,081 listed building entries currently registered in England.
43
Secondly, consent for works, be they demolition, alteration or extension, are mandatory, thereby removing
the excuse of “I didn’t think I needed consent.” Thirdly, it is easier to detect breaches of Listed Building
Control when they occur. Despite these differences, from personal experience the lack of immunity in
Listing Building Control does affect the conveyancing transaction. The potential risk of liability makes the
process longer and more onerous, with many more requisitions and checks required compared with other
transactions.
Changes under s.124, even with the watershed date, will similarly make the conveyancing process more
complex for solicitors. Every change of use and building works will need thorough investigation, enquiries
will become more extensive, and supporting evidence will be required. Such a rigorous approach will have
to be taken in order that solicitors are not negligent. It is this change of approach that the Law Society
believes could have a “chilling effect on some parts of the property market”.
44
 For example, in commercial
transactions where a client*Conv. 56  may not be buying one property but a portfolio of properties, the
additional time and work required to ascertain the planning status of each property will increase costs
considerably, cause huge delays and could result in deals collapsing. Even with residential property
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transactions there is an increased risk of chains collapsing, as solicitors struggle to ensure they can
thoroughly investigate such planning issues within the tight deadlines now demanded.
This pressure is compounded by the involvement of buyers’ mortgage lenders in the transaction. Under the
Council of Mortgage Lenders Handbook the (“CML handbook”) lenders now demand certainty in order to
protect their position. Solicitors are currently required to ensure properties have the benefit of any
necessary planning consents and that there are no breaches of planning regulations or evidence the
property may be the subject of enforcement action
45
 in order to discharge their duty of care. The Law
Society is concerned that solicitors will not be able to clearly advise on the risk of enforcement action for
past breaches and in turn will not be able to satisfy their requirement under the CML handbook. This means
“purchasers will be less willing to buy and lenders less willing to lend.”
46
 At a time when the property
market is sluggish and needs encouragement, these amendments do not assist nor give confidence to the
financial institutes to lend to purchasers.
If solicitors are unable to provide the definite answers that lenders require, it is likely that they will again
turn to defective title indemnity insurance to satisfy their CML handbook requirements and protect their
lender client from future risk. It is not the first time insurance has been seen as a solution. Solicitors were
faced with a similar situation following the decision in the case of Cottingham v Attey Bower & Jones.
47
Here it was held that a solicitor had been negligent in failing to obtain the necessary Building Regulation
Consents, make proper investigations into this issue and advise their client of the sellers’
misrepresentations to pre-contract enquiries, even though the 12-months’ time limit for enforcement action
by the Local Authority had passed. This case led to uncertainty and resulted in increased difficulty for
solicitors to satisfy their CML handbook requirements. Industry specialists reported that whilst indemnity
insurance policies were available for Building Regulation issues, pre- Cottingham few, if any, were
requested. Following the case such policies became commonplace.
48
Drawing parallels with Cottingham, there is a risk that some sectors of conveyancing, particularly the high
volume conveyancing companies, will purchase indemnity insurance as their default response rather than
thoroughly investigate planning issues. As with Cottingham, there is a worry that this quick-fix solution to
reduce delays could ultimately end up being “expensive and unnecessary”.
49
 Some believe insurance may
be obtained in situations where it is not needed; or worse still insurance will be obtained that will not
actually cover the purchaser and lenders for the specific risks and liability under s.124. This latter point
was*Conv. 57  observed following Cottingham. Here it was noted that a massive increase in indemnity
insurance for potential building regulation issues followed, but many policies obtained did not actually cover
purchasers and lenders adequately for the liability that the Cottingham decision produced. Whilst quick and
easy this automatic reaction is not helpful. It does not benefit the client and ultimately turns the planning
liability issue simply into a tick-box exercise, where obtaining insurance allows a client to “pass go” quickly.
Care needs to be taken to ensure such policies actually provide the necessary protection to purchasers and
lenders. Insurance does not give back the certainty that s.124 has taken away nor does it provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem. All it will do is provide a sticking plaster over the uncertainty, where
the only winners are the insurers.
50
Those who don’t enforce their rights should lose them
Finally, the Law Society argues that if a breach has not affected others for the requisite four- or ten-year
period then it is not detrimental to the public at large nor is it important to them.
51
 Whilst there is some
truth in this “use it or lose it” rationale, this is possibly the weakest of the three arguments.
Whilst it is true that large numbers of enforcement actions are instigated following information provided by
the general public, Richard Humphreys contends that just because no complaint has been made to the LPA
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it does not necessarily follow that there is no harm done.
52
Successive government’s rationale for the planning system has been one of regulating
“the use and development of land in the public interest … and whether the proposal would affect the locality
generally and unacceptably affect amenities that ought in the public interest to be protected.” 
53
Humphreys points out that a lack of public co-operation and a failure to raise a complaint with the LPA does
not necessarily signify either an absence of harm
54
 or that no detriment has been caused by the breach. He
offers a number of reasons for a lack of reporting by the public:
• No near neighbours, particularly in greenbelt or countryside areas.
• People wish to maintain good relations and not cause problems.
• Neighbours may not wish to draw attention to themselves and any breaches of planning law or other law
they may have committed.
• A lack of knowledge of the planning system and therefore people do not know when a breach has
occurred.
• Recent changes of land ownership resulting in local knowledge being lost and new neighbours believing
existing developments have the necessary permissions.*Conv. 58  
55
Breaches of and a disregard for the planning system affect confidence in it and people’s desire to abide by
it. Therefore is it not detrimental to the whole ethos of the planning system for the LPAs to lose their right
to enforce the law upon individuals who have actively deceived and have not played by the rules? If it is
possible to show that the planning system cannot only be circumvented but that such individuals can get
away with it, then does this not cause harm in itself?
All governments have been mindful that development has a major impact on how local neighbourhoods
look, feel and function economically, socially and environmentally.
56
 As such they view the planning system
as being at the heart of ensuring development takes place in the public interest. The planning system needs
not only to be fair but seen to be fair, in order to ensure public confidence and ultimately to maintain the
rule of law. Whilst the combination of location and concealment meant there were no complaints from the
public in Fidler and Beesley, it does not follow that no harm was done. Both developments were within
greenbelt areas where planning permission may not have been granted if legitimate planning applications
had been submitted. It can be argued that these cases did cause harm, eroding public confidence in the
planning system and weakening the perception that planning rules and policies are important and must be
abided by everyone.
Applications in the magistrates’ courts
Section 124 requires an LPA to make their PEO application to the magistrates’ court within six months of
becoming aware of the apparent breach. The court must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that
the apparent breach has been deliberately concealed and that it is just to make the order having regard to
all the circumstances.
57
 Humphreys believes that the wording of this section will ensure that the necessary
“checks and balances are properly included”.
58
 Others disagree.
First, in submitting their application LPAs are required to submit a signed certificate stating the date on
which they became aware of the apparent breach. This date is important in establishing the LPAs are within
the six months’ window to commence action. The Coalition Government justify this as being “simply an
alignment”
59
 with other proceedings within the magistrates’ courts, giving examples of traffic offences or
any other summary-only procedures having the same time limits for commencement action.
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The date of knowledge trigger, rather than the date of breach, is further justified on the basis of the
difficulties in establishing with clarity when an offence was committed. The Coalition Government argues
that they are “seeking to make the process easier, because the exact date upon which an offence was
committed may not be apparent for some time.”
60
Whilst the overall reasoning for the six-month time limit may be satisfactory, its inability to be challenged is
not. Such certificates are self-certified and taken*Conv. 59  as conclusive proof with regards to the LPA’s
date of knowledge. The individual cannot challenge them. This provides cause for concern, given that this
six-month window effectively gives the LPAs a second bite of the cherry to take enforcement action outside
of the normal limitation period and that this certificate is taken at face value without its validity being
tested.
The second concern is with the magistrates’ courts administering s.124. Magistrates will not only have to
consider whether a deliberate concealment of a breach has occurred but also whether an actual breach of
planning has occurred. This may involve consideration of issues such as whether development has taken
place, what constitutes operational development and whether there has been a change of use. Such
concepts are extremely technical in nature, involving complex questions of fact, law and judgment.
Professional organisations such as the Royal Town and Planning Institute fear that “neither the courts nor
their advisers in contrast to the LPAs are equipped to make such decisions.”
61
 It is for this reason that
matters of planning appeals were previously removed from the magistrates’ courts in favour of specialist
tribunals in the 1960s, as it was felt that they did not have the expertise or detailed knowledge to deal with
such matters.
Carnwath, too, considered the issue, reporting strong views against the involvement of magistrates’ courts
in planning enforcement matters. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities at the time believed they were
“not a suitable forum in which to argue the technicalities of planning legislation”,
62
 particularly as there are
many grey areas within the law. This argument is again applicable now.
There are fears that the argued “safeguard” of granting PEOs only when it is just to do so will not be as
effective as claimed. It may not be possible to provide a consistent approach throughout the courts, with
individual magistrates’ decisions being tainted by their personal opinions. Such influences would ultimately
have an effect on any overriding test of fairness.
When Carnwath examined uniformity in enforcement decisions he favoured the use of LPAs and inspectors.
He believed them far better equipped to provide a more homogeneous approach as they are supported, in
part, by a “body of reported decisions and circulars”,
63
 which is combined with their technical
understanding of the planning system. This observation is just as valid in the use of magistrates for the
implementation and enforcement of s.124.
Concluding thoughts
The planning system has a difficult function to perform within society. It balances the needs of businesses
and individuals, giving them flexibility to build, use and adapt their private land whilst ensuring a level of
rigidity and regulation in the general public interest.
It is an exercise in flexibility and control. With such control there is a need for enforcement to ensure
compliance from the public at large and to safeguard the rule of law. Within the planning system, as with
many areas of the law, limitation*Conv. 60  periods are set for enforcement and immunity from such
action. This is an opportunity for the state to enforce the planning rules whilst providing the public with an
element of certainty.
The cases of Fidler and Beesley dented public confidence in the planning system by exposing weaknesses in
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the 1990 Act. Why abide by planning rules if lawful status can also be achieved by dishonest actions? Whilst
clearly an issue, the Coalition Government, in wanting to be seen to do the right thing, jumped the gun,
introducing its quick-fix proposals before Beesley was heard in the Supreme Court.
Its solution under s.124 has failed at every stage. Heavily criticised initially for casting the net too wide,
beyond the likes of Beesley and Fidler who actively deceived, triggering liability for subsequent property
owners in relation to all concealed breaches. Its final form of “deliberate concealment” does not appear any
more serviceable: it is unclear, ill-defined and ineffective in dealing with those such as Mr Brown who
cleverly exploit the system. Rather than close the loophole as the Coalition Government intended, it
appears to have left it ajar.
The phrase “hard cases make bad law” seems appropriate in relation to the implementation of s.124.
Rushed through and ill conceived, these amendments appear to have produced more issues than they
attempted to resolve. The most serious casualty is definitive limitation periods, identified as a necessity by
Carnwath. Section 124 has damaged these definitive tests laid down by the 1990 Act, affecting the public
and legal professionals alike. This uncertainty permeates through to the conveyancing process, causing
ambiguity and potential delays in transactions at a time when a precarious property market needs anything
but.
Emma Hatfield
Solicitor (non-practising), Senior Lecturer, University of Huddersfield
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